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SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF DISACCUMULATION 
A 101 ON THE RATE OF PROFIT AND THE CAUSE OF CRISIS  
Alan Freeman Sunday, August 2, 2015 
Abstract 
These educational notes were prepared for a summer camp organised by Ideas Left Out at 
Elbow Lake, Ontario in the summer of 2015. I suggested to the organisers that I could produce a 
fairly simplified introduction to the discussion which would be pluralist, in the sense that it 
would introduce the various conflicting ideas about the cause of crisis and the special role that 
the rate of profit plays within it. I promised, after the discussion, that I would make the notes 
available for those who expressed interest but could not attend. Here they are. 
This article contains a shameless amount of self-reference. This is not just because the 
referenced articles of my own contain more explanation than is reasonable in a 101 
introduction, but because these articles also contain bibliographies which will allow the reader 
to explore the subject in her own chosen way and at her own chosen pace. 
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INTRODUCTION: WHY IS THE PROFIT RATE CONTROVERSIAL? 
The profit rate has been a controversial issue in economics, especially Marxist economics, since 
the turn of the last century. However, in the nineteenth century it was not, which is a puzzle. 
The following quotation from James Mill illustrates the point; he clearly regards ‘the tendency of 
profits to fall as society advances’ as an uncontroversial and established fact. 
The tendency of profits to fall as society advances, which has been brought to notice in the 
preceding chapter, was early recognized by writers on industry and commerce; but the laws 
which govern profits not being then understood, the phenomenon was ascribed to a wrong 
cause (Mill 1848, my emphasis). 
The second point to note is that for Mill, as for Ricardo and Smith who both also spoke of, and 
offered (differing) explanations for it, this tendency was not really a ‘prediction’. It was a fact. 
The problem, as Mill states, was to explain its cause.  
From the very late 1990s, beginning with the Russian legal Marxists and Marx’s Austrian critics, 
there is a change of tone: this tendency, and its importance for understanding society, becomes 
contested. Why? It clearly touches some sore point. We get a clue to where this might lie from 
Marx’s own treatment of the question. 
[G]iven the great importance that this law has for capitalist production, one might well say 
that it forms the mystery around whose solution the whole of political economy since Adam 
Smith revolves. (Marx 1991:319) 
This ‘mystery’ is not a proof that the rate of profit falls. It is the explanation. To be precise, Marx 
argues not that he discovered the fall itself, which is a recognised empirical fact, but that he has 
discovered its cause – the accumulation of capital in the course of capitalist development. That 
is to say, when capitalists use their profits to invest in new production (which is what they exist 
to do and what sustains their class in existence) they undermine, as an unintended 
consequence, the conditions for this investment to take place, and thereby, their own existence. 
Capitalism, in short, undermines itself. This was what Marx claims to have discovered. 
This is probably the most controversial result in the whole of economic theory: it leads to the 
conclusion that capitalism contains within itself contradictions that it cannot overcome. It is 
therefore very unpopular with the ‘furies of private interest’ of which Marx speaks when 
assessing the reception of Capital. 
The best way to understand the discussion – indeed, probably the best way to understand 
almost the entire evolution of economic theory in the twentieth century – is to read it as a 
history of attempts to evade this conclusion. 
I find that a useful way to think of this is to distinguish between esoteric and exoteric 
approaches to the acquisition of knowledge. These are obscure words but they are used by 
Marx to good purpose in his treatment of Smith, and they serve to understand much economic 
discussion. I describe the distinction in more detail in Heavens Above (Freeman 2015a):  
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[E]quilibrium is a metaphysical or metatheoretical construct, not a simple mathematical 
method, although it is invariably introduced in the guise of a pure mathematical technique, 
disguising its esoteric function. It thereby plays a religious, or esoteric role, not a scientific 
role. Its function is to justify the state of things that we live through and observe, not to 
explain them (the exoteric function of inductive, fact-based science) 
For those political economists – whether Marxist or not – who seek practical ways to exit from 
the crisis without paying a great price in human suffering, the problem is therefore, as Marx put 
it in his discussion of Hegel, to stand the debate on its feet – to convert it from an esoteric to an 
exoteric enquiry. The primary purpose of a theory is exoteric. It is to explain what we observe; 
therefore, the starting point of the enquiry has to be the facts – what really happens. This is not 
at all a crude empiricism; it simply re-iterates the scientific principle that if one has a theory that 
does not explain the facts, then it is the theory that has to change, not the facts. 
But in almost the entire debate since the late 19th Century, the debate has been the opposite, 
beginning from the theory and, when it conflicts with the facts, seeking ways to re-interpret, re-
present or dare we say it, manipulate the facts to render them consistent with a theory that the 
protagonists have already decided must be correct. This is an esoteric, in fact religious, mode of 
enquiry. 
The problem may appear to be complicated in that theories themselves construct facts, by 
analysing and presenting data derived from raw experience in a way that conforms to the theory 
– for example, in the presentation of the national accounts. Therefore, in what sense is it 
meaningful to speak of facts as if they existed prior to the theory? To this one can give a robust 
and no-nonsense answer, but couple it to a practical method for judging whether a theory 
conflicts, or does not conflict with the facts. 
The robust response is that the facts exist no matter how we choose to know them, or indeed 
whether we know them at all. Being determines consciousness; the material world is not 
constructed by our minds, because our minds are material.  
The practical method is really quite simple and is adopted by all true sciences and is based on 
two principles, which I term systematic pluralism and inductive consistency. It is that first, we 
should always judge between conflicting theories, never a single theory. All attempts to 
eliminate a theory from consideration, including the countless (disproven) attempts to discount 
Marx’s analysis as inconsistent or non-existent (see Carchedi and Freeman 1996, Kliman et al 
2013) are essentially dogmatisms, in that they attempt to exclude a potentially valid theory prior 
to testing it against the facts. The same applies to alternative interpretations of a theory (Kliman 
2007, Freeman et al 2014) because, if one imposes on a theory a reading that renders its 
primary conclusions unreachable, then it is the interpretation, not the theory, that has to be 
treated as questionable.  
The reason for the above is that science never tests a single theory against reality, but always 
tests rival alternatives. If potentially valid explanations are ruled out before the facts are 
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examined, we have a race with one horse; no matter how badly it performs, unless it actually 
collapses and dies it cannot but win.1 
The second principle is that the criteria for choosing between theories are those which identify 
the theory which best explains the facts as constructed by that theory. There is a simple caveat; 
the chosen theory must be judged by all the facts it can construct, not just those it finds 
convenient. This latter is the ‘consistency’ in the term ‘inductive consistency’. Economic theories 
are frequently inductively inconsistent, in that they focus on one special phenomenon to the 
exclusion of all others, which they explain perfectly, whilst at the same time completely failing 
to explain many other phenomena which they did not set out to study. Nice try, but no cigar; No 
theory which produces predictions of anything that conflicts with the facts can be accepted as 
adequate, whether or not the scholar who produced it expresses an interest in these facts. 
Indeed, the surest sign of a religious and dogmatic mode of enquiry is that its practitioners see 
no need to confront evidence that conflicts with their conclusions. 
Therefore, for example, a theory which predicts that the rate of profit should rise is invalid, or at 
least wants some changes, if in any country and at any time the rate of profit, as measured by 
that theory, falls when the theory predicts it should rise. This rules out, as we shall see, virtually 
all theories which deny the profit rate should rise, by the simple test of explaining the course of 
US profit rate from 1946 to 1968 (see Freeman 2009).  
But it also calls into question all those theories which accept that the profit rate in fact falls for 
prolonged periods which fail to explain its rise at definite points in history – as discussed below – 
by wrongly predicting that the profit rate must fall at all times and places. Moreover even those 
theories which do correctly allow for both falls and rises in the profit rate must be questioned if 
in even one particular place and time, their predictions are shown to be false. This is particularly 
pertinent to the debate, or rather non-debate, around the simple proposition that credit-money 
capital functions in modern capitalism as an element of capital stock with a claim on aggregate 
profits, and so enters into the formation of the profit rate, as discussed later (see Freeman 
2012).  
Responses to this simple idea, which provides a very coherent account of the present recession 
in all its elements, have without exception failed to respond to a single but vital empirical fact: 
according to all conventional measures of the profit rate which refuse to take financial assets 
into account, the UK profit rate has risen steeply and monotonically since Thatcher first took 
office. This flies in the face of everything else that these same theories have to say about the 
UK’s economic performance. For a scientist, the failure of a theory to explain even one salient 
fact – for example the failure of pre-Copernican theory to explain mountains on the moon – is a 
sufficient basis to discard, or at least question deeply, that theory. It’s just not serious, as John 
MacEnroe might have said, to ignore a ball that falls on the wrong side of the line, just because it 
                                                          
1 Indeed, even if it collapses and dies, provided the jockey has the strength and the hands are allowed 
onto the course, victory can be claimed by carrying the poor creature over the starting line as so much 
dead meat. This is not far from what has happened in the less useful branches of this discussion. 
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might lose you the game. The exceptional case of the UK profit rate is the case to study if one 
wishes to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of crisis. If one does not study it, one does not 
have a general theory of the profit rate. One has a theory of the US profit rate, which is a very 
different thing and not much use if you don’t happen to live in Trumpland. 
It is precisely because the debate around the profit rate does not follow these two basic criteria 
– systematic pluralism and inductive consistency – that the reader will become very confused if 
she treats this debate as a discussion about what is really going on in the world. It is in fact best 
understood as a serious of attempts, within economics but especially within academic Marxist 
economics, to arrive at a ‘respectable’ account of the laws governing a commodity society, 
which excludes the uncomfortable conclusion that such a society contains contradictions which 
undermine the conditions of its own existence. 
The problem is that once such a theory is arrived at, it can no longer explain reality. The conflict 
between theory and reality is containable as long as the contradictions of capitalism do not 
present themselves in too obvious a form, so that its many problems can be ascribed to external 
causes such as misgovernment or political interference, or to secondary causes such as financial 
imbalances or wrong practices.  
If we follow the view that has been developed as a result of the work of scholars of the 
Temporal Single System School (TSSI, see Freeman and Carchedi 1996 and Kliman 2007), we are 
led to the conclusion that though these causes do affect how capitalism behaves, just as the 
solid earth ‘resists’ gravity, they do not abolish such fundamental causes of disturbance as the 
tendential fall in the profit rate, which merely express themselves in different ways, in the 
presence of other disturbing factors. 
This imposes itself on human consciousness, at least to the extent that it disturbs the tranquil 
soliloquies of academic discourse, only at moments of extreme and prolonged disturbance – 
such as the present. 
When this happens, the previously-forgotten laws that help us to understand the causes of 
these extreme disturbance are ‘rediscovered’ – but with enormous and meticulous precautions 
to avoid expressing this in its original form, and to confine the ‘rediscovery’ to that which is just 
sufficient to excuse the failures of the mistaken ideas that have dominated for the previous fifty 
years. This took place in the ‘Keynesian revolution’ of the 1940s which, as I try to explain in 
Freeman (2015b), contained an enormous amount that was theoretically in common with 
Marx’s own analysis, accompanied by a proportionately prodigious effort to disguise this all-too-
obvious fact. 
TWO SPURIOUS DEBATES: IMPOSSIBILISM AND INEVITABILISM 
The opening shots in the debate, which dominated until the financial crash of 2008 began to 
make the ideas concerned too implausible for comfort, began with the prolonged attempt to 
prove that Marx’s explanation was impossible: that the profit rate could not conceivably fall, 
provided a certain number of very reasonable assumptions held. This came to a head with the 
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Okishio theorem (Okishio 1962, Steedman 1977), used by Western Marxists from around 1965 
until well into the 1990s – though with earlier precedents, including the Russian Legal Marxists 
and also, notably, Joan Robinson – to ‘prove’ that the rate of profit cannot possibly fall as long as 
the capitalists invest in ‘cost-saving’ technology and the real wage remains constant. Crucially, 
support for this theoretical view depends on interpreting Marx as an equilibrium theorist, a view 
particularly characteristic of the ‘Marxism without Marx’ school and its variants (Freeman 2010). 
This ‘impossibilist’ view has a counterpart which dates back to theories known as 
Zusammenbruch or breakdown theories, which asserted that the rate of profit was inevitable 
and could not but fall. This was held to be a reason that capitalism must inevitably collapse.2 
This was a minority tendency within the early history of Marxism, and the subject of much 
illegitimate abuse until the 1990s, because it suffered the disadvantage of having no adequate 
response to the arguments of the Marxism without Marx school, since the Okishio is a perfectly 
valid deduction from this interpretation. This led to such charges as that levelled by Fine and 
Harris (1976) who dubbed this school ‘fundamentalist’ on the (illegitimate) grounds that though 
it explained much of the facts, its explanatory power was unsupported by a complete and 
rigorous theory. 
With the emergence of the TSSI Marx’s value theory could once again be reconciled with his 
theory of the rate of profit and of crisis. This – and the crisis itself – has led to a resurgence of 
inevitabilism, and one school within TSSI, with roots in earlier theories of breakdown, has come 
to the conclusion that the rate of profit must inevitably fall (see for example Carchedi and 
Roberts 2013). The main problem with this well-intentioned attempt to counter the Marxists 
Without Marx is that it is not true; the rate of profit does not in fact fall all the time, and so it is 
hard to sustain the conclusion that it cannot but do so. There is some mileage to be made by 
exploring such concepts as ‘the rate of profit must fall eventually’ (see Freeman  
A number of the most recent discussions centre on this second thesis, which has quite a strong 
following; however it is easiest, and best, to understand it as the counterpart to impossibilism, 
in the following sense: both views assert the positivist view (Freeman 2009) that economic 
events have the character of natural laws that impose themselves on us, and cannot be affected 
by conscious human action. As we shall see, this is incompatible with the empirical facts that at 
definite though rare moments in history and in definite places, the fall in the rate of profit has in 
fact been reversed sharply. The most salient, but not the only example, is the US rate of profit 
which collapsed before the Second World War and was restored to a previously unattained peak 
as a result of the war and the role which the US state played in the economy during that war. 
The two poles in this debate are: 
The outcome of both these positivist attempts has been a long and – to outsiders – arcane 
debate which it is not entirely necessary to follow in order to grapple with the importance of the 
                                                          
2 See Kuhn 2007 for a balanced discussion of Grossman’s contribution to this debate; Grossman is often 
unfairly, as is usual, blamed for views more properly attributed to his followers. 
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profit rate. However, for those with a collector’s interest in the ornate, there is much bedtime 
reading here. Those with a sleep problem may consult Howard and King (1989). 
For the purpose of this introduction the critical point is the following: empirically, the profit rate 
does fall and the rate of profit does recover. Neither of the two above positions, on the grounds 
of inductive consistency, can be treated as useful contenders as explanations of reality;3 rather 
they constitute either purely theoretical positions, or at best very long-range predictions. The 
reader would be justified in concluding that they may not be of the greatest relevance to 
understanding what’s actually happening right now. 
Unfortunately, most of the literature is concerned with articulating one or other of these 
positions, which contributes to the reputation for obscurity that discussion of the profit rate has, 
somewhat unjustly, earned itself.  
THE TROTSKY-KONDRATIEFF DEBATE ON THE CONJUNCTURE 
The basic issues are quite simple if we are clear that the problem is simply to explain, as Marx 
set out to do, what we actually observe in history. This discussion, generally neglected in the 
literature, opens with the wide-ranging but sadly neglected debate among Marxists and others 
at the Conjunctural Institute in Moscow in 1924 (Day 1989 contains a commentary and several  
important translations). The issue facing the economists of the fledgling soviet state of that day 
was this: what would actually happen to capitalism and what did this allow us to conclude about 
the policies that the Soviet Union should follow? Approximately two positions emerged, well-
expressed in the sharp exchange between Kondratieff and Trotsky. 
Endogenous recovery is the view expressed by a range of ‘Long Wave’ theorists, notably 
Kondratieff himself but also Schumpeter, who successfully popularised the idea though it never 
really took hold in mainstream economics, that capitalism contained within itself the means to 
restore itself from even the deepest crisis, if left to itself. 
Exogenous recovery is the view expressed by Trotsky, in common with Keynes, that external, 
conscious human intervention could potentially lay the basis for renewed accelerated expansion 
by capitalism.  
Trotsky’s difference with Keynes, in distinction to most Marxists, lay not in the proposition that 
some kind of external intervention could create the conditions for a renewal of capitalist 
expansion. It lay in the extent of what was required; for Trotsky only the most catastrophic, 
violent and destructive of circumstances could lay the basis for a restoration. 
TROTSKY 
One can reject in advance the attempts by Professor Kontrad’ev to assign to the epochs that 
he calls long cycles the same ‘strict rhythm’ that is observed in short cycles. This attempt is a 
clearly mistaken generalisation based on a formal analogy. The periodicity of short cycles is 
                                                          
3 Although, as the principle of systematic pluralism tells us, they should never be ruled out of contention 
when we examine the evidence. 
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conditioned by the internal dynamic of capitalist forces, which manifests itself whenever and 
wherever there is a market. As for these long (fifty-year) intervals that Professor Kontrad’ev 
hastily proposes also to call cycles, their character and duration is determined not by the 
internal play of capitalist forces, but by the external conditions in which capitalist 
development occurs. The absorption by capitalism of new countries and continents, the 
discovery of new natural resources, and, in addition, significant factors of a ‘superstructural’ 
order, such as wars and revolutions, determine the character and alteration of expansive, 
stagnating, or declining epochs in capitalist development. 
KONDRATIEFF  
L.D. Trotsky, in his article titled “Concerning the Curve of Capitalist Development,” whilst not 
denying the existence of long waves in economic conditions, refused to recognize their 
patterned, cyclical character, and regards them as the result of adventitious (and, in that 
sense, random) circumstances of an economic and political nature 
For both citations see Day (1981) 
If we reject either of the two positivist extreme views, that the rate of profit cannot possibly fall 
or that it must inevitably fall, we are thus driven to consider the relation between the economy 
and the human intervention: the state is of course central but as Trotsky notes, we also have to 
consider the entire range of ‘exogenous’ factors that are now coming to the fore – wars, 
revolutions, fascism, and so on. This obliges us to consider the actual empirical facts, and much 
of the modern debate has surrounded these with two issues at stake 
(1) Does the rate of profit actually fall? And if it does, was it restored in the 1980s by 
neoliberalism, or did in fact continue to fall, signalling a deeper and more intractable 
crisis that could be overcome only by more extreme interventions or developments 
(2) Does the rate of profit actually impact the economy anyhow? 
TABLE 1: DOES INVESTMENT AFFECT GROWTH? 
Country Investmenta 
Post-crash 
growth rateb Memo: Government Spendinga 
China 48% 9.0% 29% 
India 31% 6.5% 27% 
Korea 29% 3.2% 21% 
United States 19% 0.9% 37% 
Germany 17% 0.7% 45% 
France 22% 0.3% 57% 
United Kingdom 14% 0.2% 44% 
Japan 21% 0.1% 40% 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2014 
a: share of GDP, current local currency 
b: average GDP growth, constant local currency 2008-2013 
c: (caution) investment normally includes public investment which is in addition to current 
spending. This has not been checked for the figures in this table 
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It’s easiest to approach this question by taking the second question first. At the core of the 
discussion is the notion, which is actually shared by all economists, that as the overall rate of 
return on capital goes down, the rate of investment will also fall. This being the case, it will 
depress the economy for two reasons. First of all, investment is itself an indispensable 
component of demand. Since the surplus in the economy is not consumed in its entirety by the 
workers, the remainder must be either consumed wastefully or by the capitalists, or it must be 
invested. Second, investment in new methods is the principal source of innovation and rises in 
productivity; it hence affects the capacity of entrepreneurs to expand their markets. 
What really happens? The evidence is strong that investment as such plays a major role in the 
present Great Recession. Table 1 provides an illustration (not a proof!) of three very general 
empirical laws:  
1) Countries only grow when they invest. If they stop investing, they stop growing. (that’s 
why austerity hasn’t worked) 
2) The more you invest the faster you grow. 
3) Contender countries invariably invest a higher proportion of GDP than their 
predecessors. 
 
There are three reasons for the first two laws 
1) Investment (usually but not always) increases productivity 
2) Investment is a big proportion of demand (compare government spending) 
3) Investment leads to increased consumption of constant capital 
We can explore both of these by considering Marx’s own presentation of the components of 
aggregate supply and demand (the first and least complicated mathematical part of this paper) 
THE DETERMINANTS OF AGGREGATE DEMAND 
Empirically, to get a handle on the implications of the causes of crisis, we should note that every 
crisis, at least superficially, takes the form of a mismatch between supply and demand. Put in 
the simplest possible terms, the capitalists cannot sell what they produce.4 
Surface appearances have to be explained and cannot be ignored. However, to arrive at an 
explanation of what we simply observe, we need to enquire lies behind it, for the same reason 
                                                          
4 One may run around in circles for a long time, and many do, by arguing that in fact they produce what 
they cannot sell. There is as much difference between these statements, in and of themselves, as 
between Tweedledum and Tweedledee. As far as the phenomena are concerned, all we know is that the 
two do not match. Exactly as with the course of the sun in the skies, we cannot deduce what happens 
simply from what we see; this is why we need theories. If the truth of every thing that exists was 
knowable merely by looking at it, there would be no need for theory at all. 
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that though it appears to us that the sun goes around the earth, we need to grasp  that the 
earth itself rotates before we can go beyond seeing to understanding. 
To get beneath the surface of any mismatch between supply and demand, therefore, we need 
first to consider what both are composed of. In Marx’s terms, which are also those of the 
standard ‘commodity-flow’ national accounts, the totality of the goods produced in any given 
time period is equal to C + V + S, where  
V = the value paid to the workers who produced these goods 
S = the surplus appropriated by the owners of capital  
C= raw materials or intermediate products consumed in making these goods 
If this is all sold, production can proceed in the next period but will not repeat exactly either the 
proportion or the magnitude, because either some of the surplus S will be invested in new 
production or, if the capitalists are not motivated to use the surplus in this way for any reason, 
production will decrease and capital will withdraw from production, where it will sit idle in the 
form of hoards of money, stockpiles of unsold goods, inventory, or indeed, hoards of speculative 
forward purchases of commodities such as oil. 
C can further be divided into two parts: 
K = investment (turnover > 1 year) 
C= circulating (turnover < 1 year)  
It is important to recognise that there is a relation between these two magnitudes which is 
independent of consumption. If for example a capitalist builds a factory that requires 100 tons of 
bricks and 200 tons of steel, then the demand for steel and bricks will rise in that period quite 
regardless of what happens to personal consumption. It is of course true that the decision of the 
capitalist may depend on such things as anticipated or expected demand. But it may also 
depend on other things such as the current rate of return on investments of this type, the 
interest rate, or the alternative uses of the capital. 
That is to say, investment is what is termed an autonomous source of demand. A great deal of 
complication can be avoided if this simple fact is borne in mind. 
Empirically, it’s worth noting that total output (C+V+S) is purely as a rule of thumb and to fix 
ideas – about twice the size of GDP (V+S). That is to say, the constant capital consumed by a 
‘typical’ modern capitalist economy is about equal to GDP. So for every $1 in value produced by 
workers, the capitalists use up approximately $1 in materials and depreciated plant and 
machinery  
Aggregate demand consists of the demand for these two components – both C and V+S – and 
also while both vary to some extent together (because a relatively fixed amount of raw 
materials and partly-worked-up goods have to be used up when producing a consumer good), 
investment as such constitutes an independent source of demand for constant capital (because 
when a factory is build, bricks, steel and other elements of circulating constant capital are 
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required to make it, regardless of how much the workers consume). Thus the demand for 
constant capital is not restricted to investment. Rather, it is a multiple of investment, and 
empirically, a larger multiple than the consumption multiplier. 
In consequence, no theory which attributes all cause to consumption can be complete; it must 
omit something, because the demand for constant capital varies independently of it. This is why 
the study of those factors which bear directly on this demand – such as investment – cannot be 
omitted from a complete explanation. 
A number of responses to this point have been offered in the course of the discussion about the 
profit rate, and we will turn to them. It’s worth noting however that none of these responses 
lead to a complete theory based on consumption alone. As an example, we may take the 
argument that capitalists make investment decisions which are in part conditioned by their 
expectations of sales, that is to say, future consumption. But in the present, future consumption 
has not happened; expectations can only be formed on the evidence now available to the 
capitalist. If we turn to the actual way that capitalists make their investment decisions, we in 
fact arrive at an empirical question: does their expectation of future consumption completely 
determine their decisions? To make this argument, one has to suppose that the current rate of 
return has no influence whatsoever on their decisions. That is a possible theory but not one 
which can have an immediate claim to pre-eminence, given the long experience of business, and 
the large body of economic theory, which not only recognise the rate of return influences the 
capitalists, but urges them to make it their primary concern. 
Once we leave behind us the trivial sphere of ‘monocausal’ explanations – that either the rate of 
profit, or consumption demand, are the sole and only factors operating at every level of 
economic decision-making, we have to acknowledge that the real problem confronting theory is 
the relation between these two factors and of course, their relation to other factors. This brings 
us to the most recent chapter of the discussion. 
THE DEBATE ON CAUSALITY 
The statements that either consumption, or investment, either dominate, or are primary, or are 
the sole facto which needs to be taken into account when studying crisis, are not only 
contentious, but have led to vitriolic exchanges and sharp divisions.  
These divisions are considerably less arcane, and considerably more important theoretically and 
practically, than that between the impossibilists and the inevitabilists. Writers on the whole fall 
into two schools though the real issue is more complex than to deserve this crude polarisation. 
At the risk of misrepresentation, we can summarise this as a discussion between those who 
believe that the ‘primary’ determinant of aggregate demand is the consumption demand of the 
workers and the government, and those who point out that because of the autonomy of the 
demand for constant capital, sources of demand which arise from the action of the capitalists 
themselves and above all their investment decisions, will operate at least as an additional, and 
arguably as a fundamental cause at work in crisis – at least in major crises such as the present. 
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The heat of the exchanges can obscure the fact that in the last analysis, it is an empirical and not 
a theoretical question as to which explanatory law actually holds in any given situation, provided 
the reader discounts extreme views to the effect that either consumption, or investment, can 
have no effect at all. It should also be noted that the idea that investment has no effect at all has 
a practical consequence today; it is the underlying theoretical position that underpins most 
government policy, and a mantra which has been with us since Thatcherism, that the state 
cannot possibly invest. In fact, state investment or at least public investment of some kind is the 
only way to make up for the deficiency in private demand. The above view is thus a major 
impediment to overcoming the crisis. 
There is also an ideological reason for this, which is part of the complex of class and economic 
interactions which I refer to as ‘social structures of disaccumulation’. For, once it is recognised 
that there is an alternative way to run, and improve the economy, than leaving it to private 
capital, then there is no obvious limit to the extent this is done. It therefore poses an existential 
threat to the capitalist class, at least in their minds, which is why they generally tolerate it only 
under extreme duress, such as under fascism, or with extreme guarantees of some limitations 
on it, as during a war, or when they have no choice, as after a revolution. 
It is precisely because capitalists are so unwilling to allow the state to play a role in production 
that resistance is so strong to the idea that investment demand can always be relied upon to re-
establish itself through the purely private mechanisms of the movement of capital in search of a 
profit 
It is important to distinguish between the decisions of individual capitalist and sectors, who may 
well in favour a stronger role for the state – for example the fledging domestic capitalists of 
many developing countries, as Radhika Desai (2012) has effectively pointed out – and the 
preferences of the capitalist class as a whole. The fears of the capitalists as a whole arise not 
from their economic fears but their political fears, which leads to their adoption of counter-
intuitive stances, such as opposing the New Deal, to take a classic example. This subject is 
broached in the last section of this paper: it is because the fear of the capitalists is not that any 
particular measure of the state may affect their returns, but the fact that they can set no limit 
on the action of the state, once the principle is conceded. Thus once the wall is breached, 
classes other than themselves may push the action of the state to the point where not only their 
immediate economic interests, but their existence as a class, are directly threatened. 
For this reason we are likely to fail if we attempt to explain capitalist opposition to state 
intervention in purely individual, economic terms. First and foremost, this opposition has to be 
explained as political opposition. It is precisely for these reasons that the development of 
economics requires the abandonment of economics and the recuperation of political economy 
as Desai (2016) argues. 
This issue is dealt with in the next section but is flagged up in order to ensure that even at this 
initial stage, the reader can bear in mind that economic and political issues ultimately intersect 
in such questions as ‘who holds power?’ and ‘what does the state do?’ which, it follows from the 
Trotsky-Kondratiev exchange and the whole question of exogenous cause, hold the key to the 
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resolution of the most prominent issue of all, namely ‘what are the conditions for an exit from a 
deep depression?’  
For now, we return to the purely economic discussion on causality. Lurking behind the 
somewhat superficial exchanges just discussed, there lies a further debate, which came to the 
fore in a set of exchanges between Andrew Kliman and David Harvey (see for example Harvey 
2014, Kliman 2015), in which the question of cause figures centrally. This discussion is one of 
those which I may not do justice to in a short introduction but which is pretty well indispensable 
if the reader wishes to grapple with the real difference between the conflicting accounts of the 
‘causal’ role of the profit rate and the ‘causal’ role of consumer demand, in crisis. 
Harvey’s objection to attributing a causal role to the profit rate is presented in the following 
phrases: 
It may seem I am unduly picking on the falling rate of profit theorists and singling them out 
for criticism. I do so, however, because of all the divergent theories of crisis that have 
emerged from the Marxist tradition, this one holds an iconic position within the Marxist 
imaginary and it is typically presented in such a way as to exclude consideration of other 
possibilities. There is, I believe, no single causal theory of crisis formation as many Marxist 
economists like to assert. (Harvey 2014) 
To this Kliman (2015) responds 
The real issue is not that anyone has advocated a mono-causal theory, but that Harvey is 
campaigning for what we might call an apousa-causal theory, one in which the LTFRP plays 
no role at all (apousa is Greek for ‘absent’). He is the one who is trying to exclude something 
from consideration. In light of his emphasis on capitalism’s ‘maelstrom of conflicting forces’ 
and its ‘multiple contradictions and crisis tendencies’, one might expect that he would urge 
us to consider all potential causes of crisis, excluding nothing. However, Harvey is not merely 
suggesting that other potential causes of crisis be considered alongside the LTFRP. He seems 
determined to consign it and the theory of crisis based on it to the dustbin of history. A large 
part of his paper is devoted to questioning whether the LTFRP is a genuine law, whether 
Marx really subscribed to it in the end, whether there is good evidence that the rate of profit 
fell, and whether it fell for the reason the law says it tends to fall. I will respond to all this as 
well. 
The philosophy of cause, on the whole, support Kliman’s position. Theories that propose a single 
cause of anything are rare and in science almost non-existent, because the real movement of 
any actual object is decided by many causes. If we put a magnet over a piece of steel it will rise, 
but this does not refute the law of gravity. Therefore, to reject the theory that the rate of profit 
is a cause of crisis, at least in the same sense that the law of gravity is a cause of the motion of 
objects, on the spurious grounds that such a theory excludes all other causes, is to argue with a 
straw man and, as Kliman notes, conveniently commit the crime of which the victim is accused, 
namely to exclude an inconvenient theory from consideration. 
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Harvey’s use of the word ‘typical’ is also unhelpful. It may be true that some absolutist 
explanations of crisis are somewhat monocausal, most notably the inevitabilist theories 
discussed above. But this monocausality arises not because they are Marxist but because they 
are absolutist. Setting this family aside, actually monocausality is somewhat untypical of Marxist 
theories of crisis which seek, to the contrary, to explain how the falling rate of profit interacts 
with all the many complex factors at work in crisis. The charge is, sadly, another episode in a 
dreary and long history of substituting gratuitous and perhaps crowd-pleasing epithets for a less 
popular recourse to reason and evidence. To reject a theory on the grounds of what its ‘typical’ 
proponents say is to renounce any responsibility for discussing what its non-typical theorists say. 
That is, it constitutes a spurious reason for refusing to consider the theory as such. 
Thus, accepting without demur Harvey’s uncontroversial assertion that crisis has many causes, 
this is no reason to exclude the rate of profit as one of them, and no reason to refuse to explore 
the way this variable affects all the other causes we may wish to assess. The only construction 
that makes sense of Harvey’s argument is that cause itself is a meaningless concept and one 
should not seek to attribute any cause to crisis at all. This is a position that does have some 
support in philosophical discussion but leaves us with a problem: if we cannot speak of causes, 
what can we actually say about crisis? Harvey himself does not refrain from presenting causal 
mechanisms, by simply abstaining from the word ‘cause’, for example 
2007-8 was the culmination of a series of crises in which accumulation by dispossession, 
orchestrated largely through the credit system, became a significant lever of crisis 
formation.  
What is a lever, if not a cause? In fact the very (and ironically, mechanical) simile exposes the 
central problem in this discussion. A lever, as Archimedes informed us, has two ends; if 
accumulation by dispossession was at one end of it, what was at the other? 
Causes do not operate independently. Any real phenomenon corresponds to a structure of 
causes, in which one thing leads to another. The wave of dispossessions that opened the crisis of 
2008 had its own cause. What was that cause? What was the cause of that cause? Most death 
certificates record, as the cause of death, the failure of some organ or another. Does this mean 
that aging has no role in death? Neither the fact that some people die in accidents, nor the fact 
that their hearts give out because their bodies have become too feeble to sustain them, or have 
provoked another organic failure which in turn caused the heart to stop beating, entitles us to 
say that people will live forever.  
The real problem lies elsewhere: it is to determine first of all the interdependency of these 
causes and secondly the circumstances under which each such cause may be suspended. It would 
be foolish to argue that, for example, the spectacular growth of financial assets of all kinds 
(Lapavitsas 2009) played no role in the crash of 2008. But, as I will argue below, it is equally 
foolish, and does not square with the facts, to claim that the prior fall in the rate of profit in the 
twenty years beforehand, which continued apace while this spectacular growth was taking 
place, had nothing to do with that growth. 
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The real practical problem is what will capitalism have to do in order to escape the consequences 
of the falling profit rate, just as the practical problem confronting any living human in the 
present state of medical science is what can be done to escape the consequences of old age. To 
this issue – what can be done to get out of the present crisis? – that we now turn. 
THE RELATION BETWEEN PROFIT RATE AND INVESTMENT 
In the above, we covered the reason that investment may be an important factor in crisis. What 
is the connection between investment and the profit rate? As with the previous parts of this 
paper, we offer only a summary of the wide range of positions at play. 
The notion that profit is a determinant of investment is not a Marxist fantasy, though it is 
frequently painted as such. In fact, it is a view that underpins virtually every branch of 
economics 
The simple story: Capitalists seek the highest return on capital (Business theory) 
The longer story: The rate of return on capital (classicals) or the ‘normal rate of profit 
(neoclassicals) is the ‘price of capital’ and so the laws of supply and demand will shape how 
much is invested. The lower the rate of return, the less investment, and vice versa. 
The full story: Capitalists invest if their expected rate of return is higher than other possible uses 
of their capital, including especially using it as money, either by hoarding it or by speculating 
with it(Keynes, Marx) 
THE COURSE OF THE PROFIT RATE: THE SHORT EMPIRICAL STORY 
How do the various schools of thought attempt to decide which of the above accounts holds 
good? There is no shortage of what we might term ‘theoretical absolutism’ – wrongly, in my 
opinion, laid at Marx’s door under the name of ‘dogmatism’. Theoretical absolutism argues that, 
no matter what the facts are, the theory tells us what actually happens. This is particularly 
common in neoclassical economics and in fact, the entire opus of neoclassical thought is best 
understood as a form of religious absolutism deduced from the primary proposition that the 
market inevitably works – expressed in the doctrine of equilibrium, which is merely a 
mathematical way of writing down that the market inevitably works. 
Theoretical absolutism is not at all absent from Marxist thinking of course, but is most evident in 
those schools of Marxist thinking (the majority) which have adopted the equilibrium hypothesis. 
A particularly startling example comes from Roemer (1979:380):  
Responses to this claim, of Okishio and others, have been of three types. These are, first, 
what Fine and Harris (1976) call fundamentalist positions on FRP. Second, there are 
empirical discussions of whether or not the organic composition of capital is indeed rising. 
While this sort of investigation may be useful, it does not bear upon the theoretical issue of 
whether or not the rate of profit falls due to technical change … empirical investigations, 
then, are certainly necessary, but they cannot provide refutation of a theory. 
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As explained, one purpose of this paper is to re-instate the inductive principle for which Galileo 
and any other scientists suffered much in the face of religious theoretical absolutism: when 
theory conflicts with fact, it is the theory that must be revised, not the facts. If the rate of profit 
in fact falls, and in fact the organic composition rises, and in fact this occurs at the same time 
that technical change is taking place, then to seek a reason for it is not fundamentalist but 
scientific. It is Roemer’s assertion, that facts cannot refute a theory, that parts company from 
the pursuit of truth. 
Difficulties in the modern debate arise, however, which are not the consequence of theoretical 
absolutism, but because the facts themselves are constructed and therefore, writers tend to 
exhibit a preference for those facts that support their theory. The real task is to uncover the 
theoretical presuppositions behind each presentation of the facts – for example, in the way that 
different writers choose to measure the profit rate, as we will see – and take this fully into 
account, when judging between theories. 
Certain facts are not widely disputed, and it is always wise to begin from them. First, ‘Great 
Depressions’ (1870-1890, 1929-1942, 2007-?) are always periods of low growth, low investment, 
and low profit rates. ‘Long Booms’ (1848-1870, 1890-1920,  1945-1968) are always periods of 
high growth, high investment, and high profit rates. Thus whatever happens in each individual, 
sometimes short recession, as is observed every 7-10 years under capitalism and is well-known 
to writers of all schools as the ‘business cycle’, there is an empirical connection between the 
profit rate, investment, growth and employment in the infrequent long or ‘great’ recessions 
such as that of the 1930s, and the one we are going through now. 
Probably the best and most accessible source of long-term historical data on the profit rate is 
the collection assembled by E. Maito, some of which are illustrated in chart 1 below. 
 
CHART 1: PROFIT RATES IN MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, 1850-2004 
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These illustrate two fundamental points: that there is a long-term empirical tendency for the 
rate of profit to decline in all countries; and that this long-term fall is, at definite moments, 
sharply reversed. Controversy persists, however, around what has actually happened above all 
in the USA, since the 1980s 
The disagreements concern what happens next. Especially sharp in relation to the US profit rate. 
There is a sharp divergence between two schools 
1) Dumenil-Levy, Kotz, Basu and Vasedaran, McNally and others (see the bibliography) 
maintain the profit rate recovered in the 1980s as a result of neoliberalism and the 
present crisis is not a crisis of profitability or investment, but of the governance 
structures of neoliberal capitalism 
2) Freeman, Kliman, Maito, Carchedi-Roberts (also see the bibliography) maintain the 
profit rate did not recover and the present crisis is a combined crisis of unresolved 
profitability plus other factors. 
These discussions tend to be very tightly connected to the way in which the various authors 
concerned measure, and present, the profit rate. Thus Basu and Vasedaran, as well as Kotz, cite 
only those measures of the rate of profit that support their argument. There are alternative 
measures which include 
(1) The measures assessed by Kliman (2010) which insist that the historic, rather than the 
more commonly used current, measure of capital stock is the one that accurately 
measures the value of this stock. If this is used, the recovery in the profit rate that is 
claimed by writers of the ‘recovery’ school is not observed 
(2) Writers such as Mohun and Moseley, who argue that investment decisions are governed 
not by the return on total capital but by the return on productive capital – that is, capital 
other than finance or commerce. They produce different measures of the profit rate, 
which in general show less of a tendency for recovery 
The measure which I myself advocate in Freeman (2012) which notes that the traditional 
measures of capital fail to include financial and money capital. This is contradictory since they 
include financial profits in their measure of profits, het the major characteristic of the post 1974 
evolution of capitalism – on which all writers agree – is that an ever-growing proportion of 
capital takes the form of monetary and financial assets. If the US and UK profit rates are 
corrected to remove this inconsistency, the continued fall in the profit rate is beyond doubt, as 
charts 2 and 3 show. 
Space does not allow me to examine the (growing) range of arguments around the empirical 
evidence for these views. However, the reasoning which leads me to judge that the ‘Full capital’ 
profit rate measure is superior both theoretically and empirically is given both in my article and 
in the reasoning that follows in the next section. 
I refer the reader to much published work which she or he can find with a little persistent 
Googling or, these days, by actually reading Facebook posts, though this latter is a rare and 
possibly redundant talent. 
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CHART 2: UK PROFIT RATE MADE CONSISTENT BY INCLUDING 
FINANCIAL ASSETS IN CAPITAL 
 
CHART 3: US PROFIT RATE MADE CONSISTENT BY INCLUDING 
FINANCIAL ASSETS IN CAPITAL 
 
WHAT IS TO BE EXPLAINED 
What causes the profit rate to fall? What causes the profit rate to be restored? Why doesn’t the 
profit rate get restored by the business cycle? These questions are not answered by the purely 
empirical studies considered in the last section. We have come full circle, but are hopefully 
better informed, in that if we are clearer what needs to be explained, we are more likely to 
make a better judgement of the explanation. 
In this final section, setting aside all theoretical absolutism, I address the problem of the actual 
mechanisms through which the profit rate affects investment behaviour, leading to what I 
believe is a fully coherent account of the present, and past, great recessions. In Freeman (2015c) 
I explore this issues at greater length. 
I first of all argue, calling on a lost chapter of theoretical enquiry, that Keynes himself advanced 
a theory of investment that is much closer to Marx’s than is acknowledge either by most 
Marxists, or by most Keynesians. 
To see this we have to grasp neglected aspects of the work of both writers. First we have to see 
volume III of capital as it was intended, as a work of political economy and not pure economics. 
In particular, it was meant to explain the determinates of the way all the propertied classes 
behave under capitalism, including not just the industrial or productive capitalists but the 
landlords, merchants and financiers, by asking how they get their revenue, starting from the 
formation of an average rate of profit, accompanied by its tendency to equalise through 
competition, as the governing factor of the way that any capital – be it an industrial, landed, 
merchant or purely money capital – may expect to extract a share of the total profit of society. 
The second neglected part of the theory of the past is Keynes’s concept of the Marginal 
Efficiency of Capital. The essence of the matter is that the propensity to invest is governed not 
by the average rate of profit, but by the possibilities for capitalists to secure a rate of profit 
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The ordinary theory of distribution, where it is assumed that capital is getting now its 
marginal productivity (in some sense or other), is only valid in a stationary state. The 
aggregate current return to capital has no direct relationship to its marginal efficiency… 
the extent of investment in any direction will depend on a comparison between the rate of 
return over cost and the rate of interest. (Keynes 1971[1936]:139-140. The second emphasis 
is mine) 
The reason that this affects the investment of capital, as explained by Keynes but also implicit in 
Marx’s reasoning, is that investment in production is not the only possible use of capital. Many 
other capitalist classes compete, as a consequence of the process by which the rate of profit 
tends to equalise, for a share of profits. These include merchants who do play some role in the 
actual production of goods and their circulation, but who do not participate in the creation of 
new value; landowners who will cream off the average profit rate in the form of absolute rent 
but will withdraw from production when the marginal return on their product declines (as takes 
place during a fall in commodity prices, which announced the onset of the 2016 crisis); and most 
of all, it includes financial or banking capital which plays no role in production at all. 
As the average rate falls, so does the volume of investment that is used in production. 
Alternative uses of capital take over. It is commonplace to denounce the purely speculative use 
of capital, for example the excessive greed of the landowners and the financiers. However, their 
role in the crisis, morally reprehensible though it is, is insufficient to explain it. The underlying 
cause which is decisive in the crisis analysis proposed by both Keynes and Marx, is that a certain 
proportion of capital simply remains idle – it takes the form of ‘hoards’ or pools of relatively 
liquid, monetary or semi-monetary assets, waiting for ‘things to turn up’ – for prices to begin 
rising again and for demand to pick up, or just for opportunities to speculate. The fact that very 
large sums of capital find a resting home in financial assets is no more than the modern 
expression of this general law. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF DISACCUMULATION 
The road just travelled has a destination; it is an explanation of the present crisis, leading to the 
prospect of identifying what to do about it. There are many junctions on this road, not to 
mention roadside halts, and the reader may choose to take any of these exits – I have not 
concealed them,  
However, it would be a dereliction of responsibility not to present a conclusion, especially when 
it is, despite the extraordinary efforts that are generally made to avoid it, both the only 
reasonable conclusion that conforms to the facts and is supported by a rigorous and consistent 
theory. 
The conclusion is this: by combining the insights presented above, we obtain a quite clear way to 
understand the underlying causes of the present long recession, and the reactions of the various 
classes in terms of the policies they favour and the actions they take, in reaction to it.  We then 
arrive at what is best described as a theory of the Social Structures of Disaccumulation. 
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In crisis, the proportion of capital entering production to invest in new productive capacity 
steadily reduces as the declining average rate of return – driven by the insatiable demands of all 
sections of capital, not just the industrialists – for a ‘fair share’ of the output that arises alone 
from production – diminishes the marginal prospects of finding something to invest in that will 
actually yield a profit above this simple average. At the same time a correspondingly higher 
range of opportunities are created by speculative capital as it rampages through society seeking 
to monetise, and convert into debt, every conceivable human activity from housing, to farming, 
to simply continuing to exist. This insatiable debt creation does not cut short the decline in 
productive investment opportunities however but feeds them, as it raises the rate of return on 
the unproductive investments. This ‘perfect storm’ creates the exact circumstances which 
explain a wide range of the phenomena we are now living through – and point to the means 
that are required to extract ourselves from it without suffering the consequences of another 
‘self-restoration’ like 1893-1914, or 1933-45. 
APPENDIX: SOME FORMULAE 
Suppose a private owner invests a sum k which yields a profit s over a given period of time. The 




  (1) 
Average rate of return on two or more capitals. With two investments k1, k2 yielding profits s1, 









  (5) 
where capital letters signify aggregates (so s is the sum of all the returns and K is the sum of all 
the capitals. If K is now total privately invested capital and S the total return on it, (5) gives the 
rate of profit in the whole economy. 
Part of the surplus – say, A – is invested: this is what accumulation consists of. The measure of A 
depends on the theory concerned, if a writer argues that K falls through devaluation by D, whilst 
some portion B of S is not invested, then that theory defines A to be 
 A = S – D – B (6) 
Just like (1)-(5), every theory conforms to this identity. If, therefore, over any period of time T 





All differences about the rate of profit reduce to differences about S and A; rT can be greater 
than r only if the increase in S offsets the fact that K grows by A as long as accumulation 
continues, or if A becomes negative – disaccumulation.  
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